Abstract-The Software Assurance Metrics and Tool Evaluation (SAMATE) team studied thousands of warnings from static analyzers. Tools have difficulty distinguishing between the absence of a weakness and the presence of a weakness that is buried in otherwise-irrelevant code elements. This paper presents classes of these code elements, which we call "code complexities." They have been present in software assurance as part of test cases generation strategy when evaluating static analyzers. Benefits of using code complexity include the development of coding guidelines, boosting diversification of test cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
How can one gain assurance that software is free from vulnerabilities? One step is to use static and dynamic analysis tools. Many of the common weakness and bug classes, such as buffer overflows, cross-site scripting and failures to validate input values, can be found by such automated tools.
There are many types of static analysis tools today, both proprietary and open source. These tools analyze software and detect vulnerabilities. Although a tool may be able to detect vulnerabilities in many cases, a vulnerability may not be reported if it is surrounded by extraneous elements. The reasons vary. In order to be responsive and powerful, many tools employ sophisticated heuristics. These heuristics may be engineered to summarize or ignore data in order to minimize storage or to limit the depth and breadth of analysis to save time. Thus, these extraneous elements, which we call "code complexities," may confuse static code analyzers, making bugs harder to find. This paper presents classes of code complexity.
A. Background
The Software Assurance Metrics and Tool Evaluation (SA-MATE) project at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [8] team studied a broad class of software assurance tools by performing a series of experiments, known as the Static Analysis Tool Exposition (SATE) [12] [9] [10] [11] [4] . The five SATEs utilized test cases comprised of millions of lines of code. Static analysis tool makers ran their tools on test cases and gave us their outputs, covering a total of almost 4 million warnings. Although we did not have the resources to analyze all warnings, we spent many personyears determining the accuracy of thousands of warnings. By analyzing these warnings, we learned that elements that we call "code complexities" make the detection of warnings more difficult for tools.
For the SATEs, we chose test cases in C/C++, Java, and PHP. Some cases involved production software, e.g., Chrome and Wireshark. Other test cases had been generated: thousands of synthetic programs, consisting of a page or two of code, e.g., Juliet [2] . We knew the location of all of the vulnerabilities in the synthetic programs and some of the production vulnerabilities from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [7] reports. Many of these test cases are publicly available in our repository, known as the Software Assurance Reference Dataset (SARD) [14] . It hosts more than 200 000 test cases in different programming languages.
B. Purpose Of Code Complexity
In white-box assurance using static analysis tools, defect detection is limited by the capabilities and intelligence of a given tool. The Heartbleed vulnerability (CVE-2014-0160 1 ) and the GNU/libc DNS resolver vulnerability (CVE-2015-7547 2 ) revealed that static analysis tools failed to find some bugs. To improve their capabilities and increase their use, one needs a better understanding of how tools discover vulnerabilities.
C. Using Code Complexity To Characterize Vulnerabilities
Black et. al. created The Bugs Framework (BF): A Structured Approach to Express Bugs [1] . The approach seeks to better express software bugs enclosing in four main areas: cause, attributes, consequences and sites. The attributes refer to well defined characteristics of a specific bug, e.g. source code elements. The BF is intended to characterize general software bugs classes. In particular, the buffer overflow class contains code complexities described in this paper such as access type and magnitude. 
II. CODE COMPLEXITY FACTORS
Code complexity is a feature of the programming language that, in theory, has no impact on whether there is a vulnerability or not. They are combined and nested to create real source code. The most commonly used complexities occur in expression, control or data flow, loop structure, or memory access. Each code complexity can spawn many sub categories; some of which are language specific (e.g., use of pointers in C and C++). Categories of code complexities were explained by Wu and Boland [18] .
To illustrate, consider the fragments of code in Figure I . The code on the left side has a problem in line 2: the character "C" is assigned to the variable data, but that value is never used. It is overwritten by the assignment in line 3. Programmers should be warned about such problems. At best, it is a little extra code to understand, document, and compile. In the worst case, it may indicate a bug: that the value was supposed to be used (e.g., a new call to printLine() after line 2), that the value at line 4 should be "C," but the programmer did not notice that it was overwritten at line 3, or that some other variable should have been set at line 2.
The fragment on the right hand side is functionally exactly the same, but it contains extra code that makes it more difficult for a static analysis tool (or a human!) to recognize the problem. As an extreme example, a very simplistic tool might ignore the control flow caused by the if -else statements altogether, notice the use of data on line 5, and decide that the value was (or, may have been) used.
Although this is a relatively simple case, other code complexities impose significant burdens on analysis. For example, the definition and use of a variable may be in separate files or the value may be transferred between several intermediate variables and structures before being used (or not). In theory, what we term a code complexity does not impact our reasoning regarding the presence or absence of a flaw. In both fragments, an analyst (human or automated program) must note that data was given a value, which was overwritten before it was ever used.
Note that code complexity differs from cyclomatic complexity, which is a measure of the number of paths through the code [17] . As used in this paper, the term refers to pieces of code that must be handled correctly to establish control and data flow which are frequently encountered. However, once flows and values are determined, it should not affect the detection of a flaw.
Code complexities can be minimal, such as the one in Figure  I . However, production code involves many code complexities which are intricately interwoven. Each code complexity can occur inside a loop or function call chains. Some complexities are specific to programming languages, such as pointers in C and C++.
A. Classes Of Code Complexities
We describe some classes of code complexity, using the C programming language. Some code complexities in other programming languages may not be represented here. For clarity, we will illustrate each class of code complexity with an example of a classic stack buffer overflow, adapted from the baseline snippet below. In this example, the array buffer can store up to 5 integer numbers. The C standard defines arrays as starting at index 0. Thus, the greatest index of an array is n -1, where n is the length of the array. However, our example accesses position 5 of buffer, which has a greatest index of 4 (5 -1), causing an access outside its boundaries. 
B. Other Complementary Code Elements
The following are not code complexities as we have defined them. However, they are useful attributes to consider when thinking about test cases.
• Fixed (unflawed) cases: These cases are corrected versions of flawed test cases, used to identify false positive results. A trivial "analysis tool" might incorrectly flag SQL statements as sites of SQL injection. If only flawed test cases are presented, then their lack of discrimination would go undetected. Because flaws can be fixed in a number of ways, there may be several "fixed" cases for a given "flawed" case. Our example below presents one of many possible ways to fix the overflow. Now buffer is being accessed in its 4th element, which is expected. Next subsections describe the test suites individually, and the methods for incorporating code complexity. Thus, the examples below contain detailed information about complexities identifiers, sometimes in file names or numeric codes. It is also important to note that all test suites described in the following subsections contain both flawed and fixed versions of test cases, except the one in Subsection III-C.
A. Juliet
The Center for Assured Software at the U.S. National Security Agency developed the Juliet test suite to evaluate static analysis tools [2] . The test suite is a collection of 86 864 C/C++ 3 and Java 4 programs with well characterized weaknesses (i.e., flaws or defects) of 181 different kinds. Each flaw occurs in simple code and embedded in three dozen code complexities, involving different control flow, data flow, and data types. The weakness dictionary for Juliet is the Common Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE) 5 . Code complexities and weaknesses are injected in each test case in a manner that it is uncomplicated to interpret its file name. The weakness is represented with a CWE identifier at the beginning of every file name. There will be at least one test case serving as baseline per weakness type, free of code complexity (files ending with 01). Control flow complexities, e.g. if 's, switch's, while's, for's, goto's and functions change program flow appear in tests with endings from 2 through 22. These are intermixed with global constants and static variables. Data flow complexities, such as values being passed through other variables multiple times or even through a function in different files are present in tests from 31 through 84. Note that several code complexity variants are language-specific to C++ and Java and were not described in this paper.
Following is an example of a Juliet test case file name: CWE121 Stack Based Buffer Overflow fgets 05 6 . It indicates a test case containing a stack-based buffer overflow (CWE-121 7 ), surrounded by an if using a static variable within its boolean expression (ending with 05).
B. Taxonomy For Buffer Overflows
Kratkiewicz and Lippmann [6] designed a taxonomy of C code complexities consisted of twenty two attributes, able to properly characterize a buffer access or overflow. Many complexities described in Section II appear in this test suite, including read or write access, data type and magnitude. They created four version of 291 test cases. First containing no weakness: buffer access does not cause overflow; the other three are structurally identical to the first except that they contain a buffer violation in different magnitudes: 1, 8 and 4096 bytes out-of-range, under or overflow. The four variations resulted in 1164 test cases 8 . Test cases have a twenty-two-digit numeric code describing complexities enclosing the weakness. The following is an example: 0000000100000153000110 9 . In this particular case, it represents a write of a constant value to the upper boundary of a character buffer allocated in the stack; the trigger point occurs in the same scope where its memory was allocated; it was accessed directly through a primitive variable, and the site is wrapped by a do-while loop and an if statement. We do not intend to explain every detail of the test case since that is not the purpose of this paper.
C. STONESOUP
The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) developed the Securely Taking On Software Of Uncertain Provenance (STONESOUP) program [3] , igniting security research on software binaries from unknown provenance, or third-party software. For the final phase of the program, they created a test suite 10 consisting of C and Java test cases. A test is an extension of an open source software (e.g., GNU/Gimp), spawning variants by intermixing a code complexity class, an injection point, and a weakness type. The code complexities were organized in four groups: taint source, data type, data flow and control flow. Taint source indicates an input type, choosing one from: environment variables, file contents, sockets, or shared memory. Data type indicates whether the main variable that triggers the vulnerability is: simple (primitive), array, void pointer, heap pointer, struct/union, or user defined types (e.g., typedef or class). Data flow indicates the variable type used to transport input data to a trigger point, some of the options are aliases, index aliases, constant addresses, variable number of arguments, buffer addresses, or Java generics (templates). Control flow defines language constructions that change the flow of a program: call back/recursive functions, infinite/long loops, inter class/procedures, try-catch's, function pointers, macros, goto's, and jumps. The complexities map to unique identifiers, later used to characterize test cases. All four groups are present in test cases, differing on the chosen code elements.
Complexities identifiers are stamped in file names, along with information regarding weakness and injection point. The following code name illustrates an instance of a STONESOUP test case: C-C120D-GIMP-06-ST02-DT04-DF05-CF12-01 11 . The tainted source comes from a file (ST02). Data type is a heap pointer (DT04). Data flow is a constant address (DF05), passed to another function (CF12), where a buffer copy results in overflow. The first letter indicates a test case written in C, forked from a GNU/Gimp (GIMP) source tree, containing a buffer copy without checking the size of input (CWE-120 12 ). Other pieces of information from the example aforementioned are not relevant for the purpose of the paper.
D. PHP Test Suite
Stivalet and Delaitre [16] designed a test case generator and created 42 212 safe and unsafe PHP programs 13 . The test cases cover the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) top 10 weaknesses [13] , i.e. cross-site scripting, insecure direct object reference, injection, URL redirects, security misconfiguration and sensitive data exposure. The design of code complexities within a test case starts with input coming through a taint source; passed to a sanitizing step, filtering received input; and ends with the construction of the output. Basically these are small programs that receive input, process it then generate content based on inputs.
Similarly to other suites presented in this Section, complexities of PHP test cases are present in file names. Following is a sample test case name extracted from the test suite: CWE 601 fopen no sanitizing header file nameconcatenation simple quote 14 . The input comes from a file containing a malicious URL, read with the function fopen. No sanitization is performed. The tainted source was concatenated through the header function. Note that complexities explored in this test suite are language-specific and web-oriented.
E. ITC Benchmarks
The Toyota InfoTechnology Center developed a test suite 15 for evaluating static analysis tool, incorporating characteristics of automotive software [15] . It contains approximately 30 000 lines of code, including 39 different weakness categories, mostly written in C. The test suite explores in depth undefined behaviors such as bit shifts, function casting, memory allocation on stack, and integer overflows. It is comprised of fifty different types of test cases, each type in its own file. There are eight major defect types, including memory and pointer issues, numerical defects, and race conditions. Each file contains many instances of a targeted defect in various levels of complexity. Although file names only identify weakness categories, the defects are well described in comments throughout the source code.
Complexities appear in the test cases uniformly, including data type, alias, and undefined behavior. Each test is enclosed in a function, receiving an identifier; exploring a complexity. Further in the file, tests pack multiple complexities combined. Although not clearly documented, ITC implements similar code complexities found in other test suites, such as Juliet and STONESOUP.
IV. CONCLUSION
Applying characteristics of code complexity in test suites can greatly improve the evaluation of static analyzer products. Understanding code complexity can assist in the development of coding guidelines for assuring that software is fully analyzable by static analyzers.
In this paper, we sketched many of the factors making programs less analyzable. Our five SATEs showed that heuristics and other engineering constraints may prevent tools from identifying "obvious" weaknesses. A tool may find a weakness in one context, but not another context. Hence, test cases containing many occurrences of the same weakness type, surrounded by many code complexities [5] , broadens the working range of a static analyzer, exploring more of its functionalities.
Some complexities were detailed in this paper, and some were referenced from earlier publications. The majority of available test suites used C, C++, C#, Java, and PHP. Both are attempts of creating small versions of programs as well as combining the realism of production code to improve the mechanical analysis of tools, representing the needs of organizations willing to make investments in tools.
Future research involves refining and incorporating this code complexity element in the design and selection of test cases for the next static analysis tool exposition.
